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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4190 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      
 
v. 
 
JUAN RIVERA-VELEZ, 
a/k/a "Junito",  
a/k/a "Two-Face" 
 
 
Juan Rivera-Velez,  
             Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 06-445) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
January 13, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES, JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 19, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
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Juan Rivera-Velez was charged with conspiring to distribute more than five 
kilograms of cocaine and more than fifty grams of crack cocaine (Count 1); murdering 
Miguel Batista with a firearm on September 26, 1996, in furtherance of the drug 
distribution conspiracy (Count 2); attempting to murder Rafael Colon-Rodriguez 
(“Colon”) on April 5, 2003, in order to prevent Colon from providing information to law 
enforcement officials about the Batista murder (Count 3); and using a firearm in 
connection with the attempted murder of Colon (Count 4).  Trial commenced on 
September 29, 2009, and on November 19, 2009, the jury found Rivera-Velez guilty on 
all four counts.  The District Court imposed sentences of life imprisonment on Counts 1 
and 2, 240 months imprisonment on Count 3, and 300 months on Count 4.  The 
sentencing judge also ordered that the life sentence on Count 2 and the 300 month 
sentence on Count 4 be served consecutively to each other and to the sentences on the 
other counts. 
Rivera-Velez now raises eight grounds for appeal.  For the reasons expressed 
below, we will affirm his conviction and sentence.
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I. 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we set forth only the 
facts and history that are relevant to our conclusion.   
Rivera-Velez was an “enforcer” for the boss of a large drug trafficking 
organization, Raymond Morales.  Rivera-Velez was first hired by Morales in 1993 to 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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provide protection while Morales was selling cocaine.  He was described as Morales’s 
“muscle” and it was noted that he typically carried a gun and “had no problem shooting  
. . . anybody.”  Appellee’s Br. 10.  Except when he was incarcerated from 1996 through 
2001, Rivera-Velez worked continuously for Morales until 2003.   
 Rivera-Velez perpetrated numerous violent acts while in Morales’ employ.  For 
example, in September 1996, at Morales’ direction, he shot a drug-dealing competitor, 
Miguel Batista, in the back of the head.  Rivera-Velez also shot Rafael Colon, an 
individual who had knowledge of his and Morales’ involvement in the Batista murder.  
Colon survived and identified Rivera-Velez as his assailant at trial.   
Rivera-Velez raises myriad arguments on appeal, including that the District Court 
erred in: admitting his statements to law enforcement, denying his “Rule of 
Completeness” application, admitting improper propensity evidence, not directing the 
Government to make additional disclosures pursuant to its Brady obligations, dismissing 
a prospective juror for cause, and sentencing him to a longer term of imprisonment than 
the Government initially requested.  Because these claims are plainly not meritorious, we 
will affirm. 
II. 
Rivera-Velez also argues that the proofs adduced at trial varied from those alleged 
in the indictment, because instead of proving one single conspiracy, the evidence showed 
only multiple, smaller conspiracies.  He believes that these multiple, small conspiracies 
were improperly joined into one trial and that the statute of limitations had run on some 
of his charges.   
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“A defendant alleging a variance between a single conspiracy charged in an 
indictment and the proof presented at trial must demonstrate, first, that there was such a 
variance and, second, that the variance prejudiced one of his substantial rights.”  United 
States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1337 (3d Cir. 1994).  We have said, however, that “[i]f, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government . . . a rational trier of 
fact could have concluded from the proof adduced at trial the existence of the single 
conspiracy alleged in the indictment, there was no variance.”  United States v. Greenidge, 
495 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2007).  This Court uses a three-step test to distinguish between 
single and multiple conspiracies.  
First, we examine whether there was a common goal among the 
conspirators. Second, we look at the nature of the scheme to determine 
whether the agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result 
that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the 
conspirators. Third, we examine the extent to which the participants overlap 
in the various dealings. 
 
United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).   
 In the instant case, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Rivera-Velez 
conspired with Morales and others to continuously distribute drugs during the ten year 
period described in the indictment.  As the District Court noted, although Rivera-Velez 
was incarcerated from 1996 to 2001 and “didn’t do anything during that period of time,  
. . . there’s no issue that he withdrew from any conspiracy . . . .  [A]s soon as he got out, 
he was doing what he was doing for the few years before he was sent to jail.”  Appellee’s 
Br. 41 n.18.  Indeed, as the District Court noted, “for members of . . . a single drug 
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conspiracy, to go to jail, stay in jail for a while, come back out and continue doing what 
they’re doing [is] probably more the norm than . . . the exception.  Id. at 41 n.17. 
Thus, for the reasons expressed above, we will affirm Rivera-Velez’s conviction 
and sentence. 
